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We report the results of the implementation of a quantum key distribution (QKD) network us-
ing standard fibre communication lines in Moscow. The developed QKD network is based on the
paradigm of trusted repeaters and allows a common secret key to be generated between users via
an intermediate trusted node. The main feature of the network is the integration of the setups
using two types of encoding, i.e. polarisation encoding and phase encoding. One of the possible
applications of the developed QKD network is the continuous key renewal in existing symmetric
encryption devices with a key refresh time of up to 14 s.
INTRODUCTION
During last decades, significant progress in theory, ex-
perimental study, and technology of QKD has been per-
formed [1–3]. However, QKD technology faces a number
of challenges such as distance, key generation rate, prac-
tical security, and others [1–3]. In order to make QKD
technology available for multiple users, QKD networks
are required [4]. There is a number of large projects on
creating QKD networks, in particular, in United States,
Europe, China, and Japan [5–13]. QKD networks have
a number of promising applications, for example, the de-
velopment of secure distributed databases [14]. First of
all, they offer information-theoretic secure communica-
tions between nodes. Moreover, the generated keys can
be used for continuous key renewal in the currently avail-
able symmetric cipher devices.
One of the most important challenges in the develop-
ment of QKD networks is establishing secret keys beyond
laboratory conditions [15]. Thereby it is important to use
a QKD protocol, that guarantees secrecy in urban fibers
with significant losses. This circumstance is one of the
most important distinguishing factors of experiments on
the quantum key distribution in urban conditions. It is
also important to note that the post-processing proce-
dures of sifted keys are an inherent part of QKD net-
works [16].
The purpose of this work is an experimental demon-
stration of QKD networks for systems with different
types of quantum-state encoding in urban conditions.
The quantum key distribution is implemented using a
‘dark’, high-loss optical fibre, which is laid together with
the available communication lines. One of possible appli-
cations of the developed QKD network is the continuous
key renewal in the currently available symmetric encryp-
tion devices. Russian encryption standards assume the
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Figure 1. Quantum keys transport between three users over
an intermediate trusted node. The first link generates quan-
tum keys using the polarization-encoding scheme, whereas the
second link employs the phase-encoding scheme.
use of keys with a length of 256 bits, and therefore, tak-
ing into account the use of QKD networks, they can be
refreshed approximately every 14 s.
QKD NETWORK
We employ the SECOQC approach [6], which defines
a QKD network as an infrastructure based on point-to-
point QKD capabilities. Then any two nodes of the QKD
network can establish a common private key using uncon-
ditionally secure transport. The network protocol in our
case — three nodes and two QKD links — works as fol-
lows. Node 1 and Node 2 as well as Node 2 and Node
3 establish their secret keys k12 and k23. These keys are
stored in the memory of corresponding nodes. Using a
quantum random number generator, Node 1 generates a
key K and then forward it encrypted by one-time pad,
K ⊕ k12, to the intermediate trustworthy node (Node 2).
Using previously established key k23, Node 2 transmits
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Figure 2. In (a) the first QKD link for generation quantum keys using the polarization-encoding scheme is presented, where L is
the light source, PC is the polarization controller, PM is the phase modulator, VOA is the variable optical attenuator, QC is the
quantum channel (urban fibre channel), PBS is the polzarization beamsplitter, and SPD is the single-photon detector. In (b)
the second QKD link employing the phase-encoding scheme is presented, where CIR is the circulator, BS is the beamsplitter,
DL is the delay line, SL is the storage line, SD is the synchro detector, IM is the intensity modulator, and FM is the Faraday
mirror.
K ⊕ k23 to Node 3. Therefore, arbitrary nodes (and all
nodes together) in the QKD network can establish a com-
mon secret key. We note that in order to ensure that re-
ceived keys were sent by the particular node, information-
theoretic secure authentication can be used [6].
The developed QKD network allows one to establish a
common quantum key for users with different QKD op-
tical layouts: polarization-encoding and phase-encoding
setups. The basis for our experimental work is the re-
cently presented modular QKD device [15]. This modular
QKD device is driven by NI cards with open source Lab-
View code for control and operating, open source Python
code for the post processing, and open source protocol for
external applications [16–18]. The QKD setup can oper-
ate with any type of single-photon detectors. The exter-
nal drivers of single-photon detectors, phase modulators,
and synchronization detectors are realized as removable
modules. Each device can drive up to 4 detectors and 6
universal ports for lasers, phase or amplitude modulators.
The software solution in charge of controlling the system
is written with the use of the LabVIEW environment.
Overall control of the electro-optic components is re-
alized by NI PCIe-7811R installed in personal comput-
ers [15]. The semiconductor laser LDI-DFB2.5G under
the control of FPGA board Spartan-6 generates 10 MHz
frequency optical pulses at the standard telecommunica-
tion wavelength 1.55 µm. We use ID230 single-photon de-
tectors [19]. Beamsplitters, Faraday mirror, circulators,
variable optical attenuator, phase and intensity modula-
tors are standard optical components.
The first link of the developed QKD network generates
quantum keys using the polarization-encoding scheme on
the basis of the BB84 protocol [20]. In this setup, we
have used the Pockels effect of low voltage electro-optical
phase modulators based on LiNbO3 (see Fig. 2a). We
note that this method allows one to employ single laser
source for polarization-encoding implementation, while
most polarization state implementations suffer from the
pulse indistinguishability problem [21]. Furthermore,
only two single-photon detectors are required in contrast
to the standard polarization schemes with four detectors.
This link ensures the exchange of keys at a distance of
up to 30 km (in urban fibers with losses on the level of
13 dB, the mean number of photons is µpol = 0.02) with
the sifted key generation rate of about 0.1 Kbit/s.
The second link relies on another optical layout for
QKD — the phase-encoding scheme (see Fig. 2b) with the
use of the seminal BB84 protocol. This scheme has been
already used for QKD across urban fiber channels [22].
This link allows one to generate secret keys at a distance
of up to 15 km (in urban fibers with losses on the level
of 7 dB, the mean number of photons is µph = 0.03),
with the sifted key generation rate of approximately 0.2
Kbit/s.
In Fig. 3 we present the average value of QBER as the
function of time (data is presented for 6 hours). One
can see that realistic error rates in the sifted key are of
the order of a few percent, which is too high for direct
applications, e.g., for using as keys for one-time pad en-
cryption or for key renewal in symmetric ciphers. In or-
der to correct down this error rate as well as reduce this
potential information of an eavesdropper to a negligible
quantity we use the post-processing procedure, which is
described below.
SECRET KEY GENERATION RATE
The sifted keys from both QKD links are the input
for the post-processing procedure, which consists of in-
formation reconciliation, parameter estimation, privacy
amplification, and authentication check stages [16]. The
procedure works as follows.
(i) Sifted keys from the QKD links go through the in-
formation reconciliation stage based on the symmet-
ric blind technique [17] based on the use of low-
density parity-check codes [23, 24]. We note that
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Figure 3. The average value of QBER is shown as the function of time (during 6 hours): (a) for the polarization-encoding
setup and (b) for the phase-encoding setup.
this technique allows performing an information rec-
onciliation with very rough or even absent estima-
tion on the QBER. Furthermore, the blind infor-
mation reconciliation protocol allows significant in-
crease the efficiency of the error correction proce-
dure and reduces its interactivity [17].
(ii) After the information reconciliation stage, there is
still a certain probability that not all errors are
corrected. To detect possible remaining errors, we
implement a subsequent verification protocol using
universal hash functions [26] The probability of the
presence of errors after successful verification of the
block of ≈ 1 Mbit key is limited to the value of
εver = 2 × 10−11 when using hash-tag of 50 bit
length. The detailed description of the verification
protocol is presented in Ref. [26]. A general binary
sequence obtained at this stage is called a verified
key.
(iii) In the parameter estimation stage the parties obtain
the actual level of the QBER for their key blocks via
direct comparison of the keys before and after the
information reconciliation. In fact, this step is per-
formed on the Bob’s side where the modification of
the sifted key was performed on the previous stage.
If the value of QBER appeared to be higher than
the critical value needed for efficient privacy ampli-
fication, the legitimate parties abort the protocol.
Otherwise, the verified key blocks go to the privacy
amplification stage, and estimated QBER is used in
next rounds of the information reconciliation [16].
(iv) The privacy amplification stage is used to reduce po-
tential information of an adversary about the veri-
fied blocks to a negligible quantity. This is achieved
by a contraction of the input verified key into a
shorter string. The length of the secret key is given
by an expression
Lsec = LverYˆ1(1− h(qˆ1))− leakec − 5 log2(1/εpa), (1)
where Lver is length of the verified key, Yˆ1 is an
estimation of the portion of the sifted key bits gen-
erated from single photons pulses,
h(q) = −q log2 q − (1− q) log2(1− q) (2)
is binary entropy function, qˆ1 is an estimation of
the QBER for single photon pulses, leakec is total
number of bits disclosed in information reconcilia-
tion and verification stages, and εpa is the failure
probability of privacy amplification stages. In our
setup we have adopted the value εpa = 10
−12.
The estimation for Yˆ1 is as follows:
Yˆ1 =
ηµ− p2
ηµ
, (3)
where η is the transmission coefficient of the quan-
tum channel, µ is the intensity of the employed laser
pulses, p2 = e
−µµ2/2 is probability of two photons
emission in the generation of coherent pulses. This
estimate is obtained on the assumption that Eve can
perform an attack with a separation of the number
of photons, as well as other operations with quan-
tum states being transmitted, but it cannot influ-
ence Alices and Bobs setups (for instance, it can-
not modify the intensity of the signals sent by Alice
or the efficiency of Bobs detector). In Eq. (3) we
have also neglected the probability of emitting sig-
nal with n > 2 photons. This assumption is reason-
able since our QKD setups use pulses of very low
intensity (µpol = 0.02 and µph = 0.03). The esti-
mation of the QBER in the single photon pulses,
4in the assumption that all the errors appeared in
single-photon pulses only, is given by the following
expression:
qˆ1 =
q
Y1
, (4)
where q is the QBER value obtained in parameter
estimation step.
After the calculation of the length of a final key (for
each verified block of key) according to the method
presented in Ref. [16], the privacy amplification can
be performed: the block of the secret key is com-
puted as a result of application of 2-universal hash
function to the verified key. In our post-processing
procedure the Toeplitz hashing is employed [27, 28].
The resulting key is called the secret key or the final
key. It is the output of a QKD protocol.
(v) Finally, the parties check the authenticity of their
classical channel by exchange of hash values of all
the incoming traffic. In our setup we use Toeplitz
hashing together with the one time-pad encryption.
The length of the hash value was set to be lauth = 40
bit which bounds the probability of successful man-
in-the-middle attack at the level of
εauth = 2× 2−lauth < 2× 10−12. (5)
If the authenticity is verified, the parties reserve
2lauth bits of their secret keys for the next post-
processing round. Then we arrive at the following
expression:
Lsec = Lsec − 2lauth, (6)
where Lsec bits of the final key that can be used in
cryptographic purposes.
The final security level of the obtained key is as follows:
εQKD = εver + εpa + εauth < 2.3× 10−11. (7)
We note that the security level of secret key distributed
across the QKD network with N nodes is given by the
following expression:
εQKDNet = (N − 1)× (εQKD + εauth). (8)
Here, the term εauth comes from the fact that the addi-
tional authentication is required. For our QKD network
with N = 3 we then have εQKDNet < 5× 10−11.
If τ is the time needed to generate a verified key with
the length Lver, then the secret key rate can be defined
as follows:
Rsec = Lsec/τ. (9)
Applying our post-processing procedure to experimen-
tally generated keys, we obtain that the first QKD link
provides key exchange over 30 km with the secret key
generation rate of about 0.02 Kbit/s. The second QKD
link allows establishing of the secret keys over 15 km,
with the secret key generation rate of approximately 0.1
Kbit/s. The primary application of such quantum keys
is continuous key renewal in the currently available sym-
metric ciphers with the key refresh time up to 14 seconds.
The main application of quantum-distributed keys is
the continuous key renewal in the currently available
symmetric encryption devices. Russian encryption stan-
dards assume the use of keys with a length of 256 bits,
and therefore, taking into account the use of QKD net-
works, these keys can be refreshed approximately every
14 s. This refresh period is limited by the rate of key
generation.
CONCLUSION
We have described in detail the implemented QKD net-
works based on the trusted repeater’s paradigm. The
developed QKD network has been tested using standard
fibre-optic communication lines in Moscow. It is impor-
tant to note that the network connects users with two
different optical schemes of phase and polarisation en-
coding.
In designing the network, we have used a dark fibre,
laid jointly with the communication lines in use, which
produce parasitic illumination at the telecommunication
wavelength. One of the network links represents a de-
vice based on a one-way scheme of key distribution. This
scheme, in contrast to an auto-compensating one, allows
one to send continuous sequences of pulses; however, it
requires stabilisation relative to the fluctuation of the
polarisation state in the quantum channel, caused by ex-
ternal factors (mechanical and thermal effects). Unlike
the laboratory conditions, tests in a real urban communi-
cation line require regular adjustment of parameters and
calibration. The tests confirmed the capability of the sys-
tem to compensate for external impacts in conditions of
real urban communication lines [21], which allows, in the
future, these devices to be integrated into the existing
infrastructure.
The main application of such quantum keys is the con-
tinuous key renewal in currently available symmetric en-
cryption devices.
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